Use the Keys Pre-Distribution KDP-scheme for Mandatory Access Control
  Implementation by Belim, S. V. & Belim, S. Yu.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
10
45
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
6 D
ec
 20
18
Use the Keys Pre-Distribution KDP-scheme for
Mandatory Access Control Implementation
S.V. Belim, S.Yu. Belim
Dostoevsky Omsk State University, Omsk, Russia
Abstract
The possibility of use the keys preliminary distribution KDP-scheme for mandatory access control
realization in the distributed systems with user’s hierarchy is considered. The modified keys prelim-
inary distribution algorithm is suggested. It is developed a method for creation of subsets family for
solution this task.
Keywords: keys pre-distribution scheme, KDP-scheme, security model, mandatory access
control.
1 Introduction
Mandatory differentiation of access is more rigorous in comparison with a discretionary analog.
The centralized security subsystem is necessary for its realization. At system there has to be
a uniform center of a decision making comparing mandates of access. This problem is easily
solved in local systems. There are some difficulties for the distributed systems. Now this
problem is solved on the basis of open keys certificates. Such decision cannot be considered
satisfactory. Certificates use sluggish asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. The system based
on certificates uses the center of confirmation.
Qualitatively other algorithm can be constructed on the basis of keys preliminary distri-
bution schemes. In this case the role of the central server comes down only to key materials
distribution. Network’s subscribers calculate keys of information exchange self-contained. The
main problem consists that widely known keys preliminary distribution schemes [1, 2] provide
information exchange for each user with everyone. Modification of such schemes is necessary for
accounting of security policy of system. Modifications of the Blom’s keys preliminary distribu-
tion scheme, considering the forbidden channels it is suggested in work [3]. The organization of
simplex channels for the same scheme is realized in article [4]. The solution similar task on the
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basis of the KDP scheme is proposed in articles [5, 6]. These works are focused on realization
of discretionary security policy. Mandatory security policy demands accounting of hierarchy,
both subjects, and objects. The decision on the basis of hash functions is suggested in article
[7]. However this approach does not allow realizing exchange between users taking into account
hierarchy.
The purpose of this article is development of the keys preliminary distribution scheme
allowing realizing mandatory security policy in the distributed computing systems.
2 Keys preliminary distribution scheme
Mandatory access control uses a security tags set which form an algebraic lattice. Security tags
are both at users, and at informational objects. At request for access there is a comparison of
security tags. The decision is made on the basis of some logical condition.
Let’s designate the set of users in the distributed system U . For users of system there is an
order relation. We will be limited to the order relation described by the graph in the form of
a tree. Dominance of the user ui over the user uj we will designate ui > uj. Also the situation
when users are incomparable with each other is possible. Let’s use then designation ui <> uj.
We will be limited to a case of mandatory access control in which only informational streams
from below up are resolved. This case corresponds to mandatory security policy on ensuring
confidentiality of information. In this case for two users ui > uj is resolved only informational
stream from uj to ui. For two incomparable users informational streams in both parties are
forbidden.
Let’s set the task to formation the key scheme allowing communicating according to manda-
tory access control. For this purpose we will construct the keys preliminary distribution scheme
calculating pair keys only for the allowed channels.
For the solution this task we modify the KDP scheme of keys preliminary distribution.
For system without access control in the KDP scheme key materials is formed in based of
set K = {k1, ..., kn}. Key materials beforehand are sent to all users via secure channels. For
development of pair keys the system subsets S = {S1, ..., Sm} of set {1, ..., n} is used. m –
number of users in system. The set S is open. For information exchange with the user uj the
user ui takes subsets Si Sj . Further he calculates the elements entering in the product of sets
2
Sij = Si ∩ Sj. The pair key is calculated with use the key materials K, and subsets Sij:
kij = ⊕kl (l ∈ Sij).
The same operations are carried out by the user uj when obtaining the message from ui.
The scheme described above allows carrying out exchange of messages for each user with
everyone in both directions. We modify the scheme, having entered into it asymmetry of keys
kij 6= kji. For this purpose also we use the key materials K and a set S. For calculation the
key of encrypting for the channel from uj to ui we use the difference of two sets:
△Sij =


Si \ Sj, if Si ∩ Sj = ∅
Si ∩ Sj, overwise
kij =
⊕
l∈Sij
kl.
Such approach leads to automatic implementation the requirement of keys asymmetry. For
reading messages the user ui (i = 1, ..., m) will use keys kij (j = 1, ..., m), and for sending
messages – keys kji (j = 1, ..., m). The suggested scheme is based on the symmetric encrypting
that accelerates processes of encrypting and decrypting.
We realize the ban on channels of information exchange. For this purpose we will demand
that the corresponding pair keys were zero kji = 0, that is Sij = ∅. From here we receive
requirements to a set of subsets S. The most widespread approach to creation the set of S
is uses of the Sperner’s families [1]. The Sperner’s family [2] is called the family of subsets
D = {D1, ..., Dn} such that, if Di ∩ Dj ⊆ Dt, that either t = i, or t = j. In the unmodified
KDP scheme on the basis of elements Di the Shperner’s family are formed Sij. We use similar
approach for the solution the problem. Let’s create the Shperner’s family with the quantity of
elements equal to number of users D = {D1, ..., Dm}. We will form a set S, moving on a tree
of users hierarchy leaves to a root. Let’s allocate ”leave’s” users u1, ..., ul, where l – quantity
of leave’s tops on the tree. Let’s equate, the elements of a set S corresponding to them, to
Sperner’s family elements Si = Di (i = 1, ..., l). Let’s rise from leaves to a tree root. If the top
of ui has the closest descendants ui1, ..., uik, then to this user there corresponds the set:
Si = Si1 ∪ Si2 ∪ ...Sik ∪Di.
This algorithm of formation the set S leads to realization of the required condition the manda-
tory access control: if ui > uj, then Si ⊃ Sj, and Si \ Sj 6= ∅, but Sj \ Si = ∅. Thus, users
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can create a pair key only for the allowed communication channels. Also the requirement for
incomparable users is fulfilled: if ui <> uj, then Sj \ Si = ∅ and Si \ Sj = ∅.
3 Example of keys preliminary distribution scheme
Let’s consider implementation the suggested scheme on a simple example. In system seven
users are authorized. The hierarchy of users is shown in the figure 1.
Figure 1: Hierarchy of users.
Let’s define the key materials set with 15 one byte elements:
k1 = 00100100, k2 = 10101010, k3 = 01010101, k4 = 11011011,
k5 = 11101110, k6 = 00010001, k7 = 10010010, k8 = 10110110,
k9 = 00011000, k10 = 11101110, k11 = 10111001, k12 = 11100111,
k13 = 00101101, k14 = 11010010, k15 = 01111111.
We will set the Sperner’s family as follows:
D1 = {1, 2}, D2 = {3, 4}, D3 = {5}, D4 = {6, 7, 8},
D5 = 9, 10, D6 = {11, 12, 13}, D7 = {14, 15}.
For sheet tops the sets S are defined as
S4 = D4 = {6, 7, 8}, S5 = D5 = {9, 10}, S6 = D6 = {11, 12, 13}, S7 = D7 = {14, 15}.
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For other users
S2 = S4 ∪ S5 ∪D2 = {3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}, S3 = S6 ∪ S7 ∪D3 = {5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
S1 = S2 ∪ S3 ∪D1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15}.
Process of formation sets S is presented in the figure 2.
Figure 2: Formation sets S.
For calculation of pair keys we will define set differences
∆S12 = S1 \ S2 = {1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
∆S13 = S1 \ S3 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10},
∆S14 = S1 \ S4 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
∆S15 = S1 \ S5 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
∆S16 = S1 \ S6 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15},
∆S17 = S1 \ S7 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13},
∆S21 = S2 \ S1 = ∅,∆S23 = S2 \ S3 = ∅,
∆S24 = S2 \ S4 = {3, 4, 9, 10},
∆S25 = S2 \ S5 = {3, 4, 6, 7, 8},
∆S26 = S2 \ S6 = ∅,∆S27 = S2 \ S7 = ∅,
∆S31 = S3 \ S1 = ∅,∆S32 = S3 \ S2 = ∅,∆S34 = S3 \ S4 = ∅,∆S35 = S3 \ S5 = ∅,
∆S36 = S3 \ S6 = {5, 14, 15},
∆S37 = S3 \ S7 = {5, 11, 12, 13},
∆S41 = S4 \ S1 = ∅,∆S42 = S4 \ S2 = ∅,∆S43 = S4 \ S3 = ∅,∆S45 = S4 \ S5 = ∅,
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∆S46 = S4 \ S6 = ∅, ∆S47 = S4 \ S7 = ∅,
∆S51 = S5 \ S1 = ∅, ∆S52 = S5 \ S2 = ∅, ∆S53 = S5 \ S3 = ∅, ∆S54 = S5 \ S4 = ∅,
∆S56 = S5 \ S6 = ∅, ∆S57 = S5 \ S7 = ∅,
∆S61 = S6 \ S1 = ∅, ∆S62 = S6 \ S2 = ∅, ∆S63 = S6 \ S3 = ∅, ∆S64 = S6 \ S4 = ∅,
∆S65 = S6 \ S5 = ∅, ∆S67 = S6 \ S7 = ∅,
∆S71 = S7 \ S1 = ∅, ∆S72 = S7 \ S2 = ∅, ∆S73 = S7 \ S3 = ∅, ∆S74 = S7 \ S4 = ∅,
∆S75 = S7 \ S5 = ∅, ∆S76 = S7 \ S6 = ∅.
Pair keys will be defined by equalities:
k12 = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k5 ⊕ k11 ⊕ k12 ⊕ k13 ⊕ k14 ⊕ k15 = 10111110,
k13 = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕ k4 ⊕ k6 ⊕ k7 ⊕ k8 ⊕ k9 ⊕ k10 = 11000011,
k14 = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕ k4 ⊕ k9 ⊕ k10 ⊕ k11 ⊕ k12 ⊕ k13 ⊕ k14 ⊕ k15 = 00101000,
k15 = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕ k4 ⊕ k5 ⊕ k6 ⊕ k7 ⊕ k8 ⊕ k11 ⊕ k12 ⊕ k13 ⊕ k14 ⊕ k15 = 00000101,
k16 = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕ k4 ⊕ k5 ⊕ k6 ⊕ k7 ⊕ k8 ⊕ k9 ⊕ k10 ⊕ k14 ⊕ k15 = 10000000,
k17 = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕ k4 ⊕ k5 ⊕ k6 ⊕ k7 ⊕ k8 ⊕ k9 ⊕ k10 ⊕ k11 ⊕ k12 ⊕ k13 = 01011110,
k21 = 0, k23 = 0,
k24 = k3 ⊕ k4 ⊕ k9 ⊕ k10 = 01111000,
k25 = k3 ⊕ k4 ⊕ k6 ⊕ k7 ⊕ k8 = 10111011,
k26 = 0, k27 = 0,
k31 = 0, k32 = 0, k34 = 0, k35 = 0,
k36 = k5 ⊕ k14 ⊕ k15 = 01100011,
k37 = k5 ⊕ k11 ⊕ k12 ⊕ k13 = 10011111,
k41 = 0, k42 = 0, k43 = 0, k45 = 0, k46 = 0, k47 = 0,
k51 = 0, k52 = 0, k53 = 0, k54 = 0, k56 = 0, k57 = 0,
k61 = 0, k62 = 0, k63 = 0, k64 = 0, k65 = 0, k67 = 0,
k71 = 0, k72 = 0, k73 = 0, k74 = 0, k75 = 0, k76 = 0.
The constructed keys preliminary distribution scheme satisfies the hierarchy of subjects shown
in the figure 1. Only information channels are resolved ”from below-up”. Incomparable users
also cannot communicate.
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The suggested scheme can be used also in systems with the hierarchy of users other than a
tree. Let’s review an example in the figure 3.
Figure 3: Hierarchy of users.
By the same principle elements of the set S are calculated (the Figure 4.)
Figure 4: Hierarchy of users.
The keys contradicting mandatory security policy are equal to zero.
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Conclusion
The scheme suggested in this article allows realizing keys preliminary distribution of a sym-
metric enciphering for the distributed systems with user’s hierarchy. As well as in case of the
KDP scheme the Sperner’s families are used. However KDP scheme allows forming bidirectional
channels of information exchange whereas the suggested scheme is focused on simplex channels.
The suggested modification of the keys preliminary distribution scheme does not increase the
size of key materials. It is an indispensable condition for using this approach to creation the
protected systems.
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